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ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the text format of judicial and semi-judicial decisions. That format does
not optimize comprehensibility. It should be understood as a sign that symbolizes an ideology. It
symbolizes the values of an inevitable decision that follows from the facts and an a priori given coherent
and complete legal system. The narrative text format with it stylistic features is also a very welcome
instrument to hide the moments that this ideal is impracticable.
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1. THE FORMAT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Bhatia (1993) claims that judicial decisions have a typical four moves structure:
identifying the case, establishing the facts of the case, arguing the case and pronouncing
the judgment. Arguing the case has three sub-moves: stating the history of the case,
presenting arguments, deriving ration decidendi. Davide Mazzi (2007) analyses a corpus
of English and Irish judgments and a corpus of EC judgments in which he discovers
relatively similar structures. In a scheme:
House of Lords/Ireland’s Supreme Court
 identifying the case
 establishing the facts of the case
 arguing the case
o stating the history of the case
o identifying the conflict
categorization
o presenting the arguments
o deriving the ratio decidendi
 pronouncing the judgment

of

Court of Justice of the EC
 identifying the case
 identifying the scope of proceedings before
the Court
 retrieving the relevant Community and/or
national legislation
 stating the history of the case
 arguing the case
o arguments of the parties
o arguments of the Court
 settling costs
 pronouncing judgment

I have analyzed (a) a broad sample of decisions of different judicial courts, (b) a sample
of 30 decisions of first instance criminal courts (Van den Hoven & Plug 2008), (c) a
sample of over 60 decisions of semi-judicial institutions (decisions of a local social
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security appeal committee, decisions of the Netherlands Competition Authority, decisions
of the Dutch Data Protection Authority). The texts under (c) were analyzed to prepare for
interventions within these institutions. During these interventions—in the form of two- or
three-day seminars—text formats, argument structures as well as the stylistics of the texts
were extensively discussed with the actual writers (which are often not the same persons
as the formal decision makers). In all cases mentioned under (c) and in part of the cases
mentioned under (a) the files were available that show concept versions, comments of
seniors, comments of the formal decision makers; these files provide a detailed insight in
the conventions, the tactics and sometimes also in the process of socialization of new
writers.
These analyses of Dutch judicial and semi-judicial practices show similar
structures as the ones Bhatia and Mazzi found. However, the texts show minor variations.
Stating the history of the case is sometimes an element that stands relatively apart from
arguing the case, mixed with the facts. Especially in the decisions of the appeal
committee a very long history of the specific client is often incorporated at the beginning
of the text. In Dutch law court decisions we usually do not find a separate part in which
the relevant legislation is retrieved. But in texts of the Dutch Data Protection Authority
we do find this element very extensively. Formal judicial decisions have an explicit
speech act of pronouncing the judgment, while semi-judicial decisions tend to draw just a
conclusion from the arguments, without repeating this as an explicit declaration. Some of
the semi-judicial institutions present the text as an appendix of a formal letter; this is not
done in the court decisions. And so on. These variations exist mainly between the sub
corpora, not within the sub corpora. Within the sub corpora the homogeneity on the
macro level and in micro stylistics is staggering, even where the variance of writers’
quality on the micro level is large. So the preference for these structures seems to be
unrelated to writing skills.
All formats have in common that the first part of the text focuses on the facts.
Texts start with an identification of ‘factual’ elements of the particular case. All texts end
with the decision. The presentation of the arguments (arguing the case) is always
between the facts as the opening stage and the decision as the last stage. This
macrostructure tends to repeat itself in the heart of the argumentation. There we see again
a preference for a presentation order: arguments—conclusion. A presentation order
standpoint—arguments is rare.
The texts also share a high degree of repetition and paraphrases. This seems to be
a consequence of the macro structure. Because the facts and (optionally) relevant
legislation are first separated from the presentation of the arguments, there is a need to
repeat these facts and a (paraphrase of) the applicable legal rules in the actual
argumentation.
2. EXAMPLES
I will present some examples to illustrate these observations. The examples are authentic
but are made unrecognizable. In the translations the Dutch word order is followed rather
directly. The first text is a typical example of the findings of an official investigation of
the Dutch Data Protection Authority. The Dutch DPA supervises the compliance with
acts that regulate the use of personal data, such as the Personal Data Protection Act. This
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law regulates under which conditions personal data may be gathered, stored and
distributed. Here a so called ‘social’ website, addressed mainly to minors, is investigated.
Formally this text does not entail a judicial decision, although its conclusions can be the
ground for a legal enforcement. The text is presented as the supplement to a one page
letter that states that the investigated practice is unlawful and refers to the supplement.
The last sentence of this letter is:
(1) In het bijgaande rapport heeft het CBP aangegeven welke maatregelen noodzakelijk worden
geacht.
In the attached report the DPA has indicated which measures are considered necessary.

This sentence shows some of the typical features that we see time and again on the micro
level of (semi-)judicial texts. Measures are considered necessary. On crucial moments
the agent of interpretative and evaluative acts (to consider) is hidden, even though in the
sentence this agent (CBP) is explicitly present as the agent of non-interpretative act (to
attach).
The supplement starts with a heading Description of the facts established on the
basis of a copy of the website, followed by Legal framework (Juridisch kader), Judgment
(Beoordeling) and Conclusion. The first three headings have subheadings, but the
subheadings of the Legal Framework have no clear relation with the subheadings of
Judgment. This reveals that the structure of both sections is functionally unrelated. Most
facts and rules are repeated in the section Judgment—the heart of the argumentation although not literally. So the macro structure is not functionally utilized. It symbolizes a
logic: facts—rules—judgment, but actually it is filled in as: series of ‘facts’—series of
structurally unrelated rules—structurally unrelated paraphrased selection from these
facts and rules in an argument structure.
We will quote two short passages from the Judgment section. Passage (2) typically
illustrates how the macrostructure is copied in the heart of the argumentation: facts—
rule—(conclusion). In (3) we find a very frequent hybrid order: rule—facts—‘broad’
argumentative indicator—conclusion - facts.
(2) X heeft na ontvangst van de voorlopige bevindingen zijn firmanaam en vestigingsadres
bekend gemaakt in de privacyverklaring. Hiermee voldoet X echter niet aan het bepaalde in
artikel 33 Wbp, zoals uitgewerkt in de richtsnoeren, om naast zijn naam en vestigingsadres
ook een elektronisch contactadres te vermelden.
After receipt of the provisional findings X has published his company name and address in the
privacy statement. By this however X does not satisfy article 33 Personal Data Protection Act,
as worked out in the directives, to publish besides his name and company address also an
electronic contact address.
(3) Artikel 6 Wpb schrijft voor dat persoonsgegevens in overeenstemming met de wet en op
behoorlijke en zorgvuldige wijze dienen te worden verwerkt. […] Vaststaat dat X zich
expliciet richt op de kwetsbare groep van jongeren tussen de 10 en de 15 jaar. Van jongeren
onder de 16 jaar kan niet worden aangenomen dat zij goed in staat zijn om de consequenties
van hun acties te overzien. Kinderen zijn inherent kwetsbaar, met een nog niet volledig
ontwikkeld vermogen om zelf keuzes te maken. Gelet op het vorenstaande handelt X in strijd
met het bepaalde in artikel 6 nu hij geen rekening heeft gehouden met het feit dat alleen de
wettelijk vertegenwoordiger toestemming kan geven voor een minderjarige.
Article 6 Personal Data Protection Act prescribes that personal data should be processed in
accordance with the law and in a proper way. […]. Established is that X explicitly addresses
the vulnerable group of young people between 10 and 15 year. Young people under 16 can
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not be expected to take in all the consequences of their actions. Children are inherently
vulnerable, with a not yet fully developed ability to make choices themselves. Considering the
above-mentioned, X acts in violation with what is prescribed in article 6 now that he has not
taken in account the fact that only the legal representative can give permission for a minor.

Fragment (3) illustrates some of the standard micro features. Subjectivity markers are
avoided, no indication is given of the specific agent voice (the CBP): Established
is …Young people under 16 can not be expected to…X acts in violation….
The second example comes from a criminal judgment. The text follows the
standard format for this type of decisions: identifying the case, the trial, indictment,
evidence, punishability of the fact and the offender, motivation of the penalty, applicable
sections of the law, decision. I quote from the motivation of the penalty to show how it
uses the facts—(rules)—conclusion format, as in all thirty cases that were examined
(compare Van den Hoven & Plug 2008).
(4) Verdachte is samen met zijn zoon naar iemand, van wie hij meende nog geld tegoed te hebben,
toegegaan en heeft toen hij in het huis van het slachtoffer was hem samen met zijn zoon
verbaal bedreigd teneinde een geldbedrag afhandig te maken. Dit mislukte omdat het
slachtoffer geen geld in huis had. Wel is het verdachte gelukt om onder bedreiging van een
stofzuigerstang het slachtoffer zijn mobiele telefoon te ontfutselen. [meer feiten]. De
rechtbank rekent verdachtes gewelddadige handelwijze bij de afpersing en de poging daartoe
ernstig aan. Daarbij is van belang dat dit soort feiten niet alleen de slachtoffers grote schrik
aanjaagt en nog lange tijd gevoelens van angst en onzekerheid met zich mee zal brengen,
maar ook in de samenleving leidt tot gevoelens van onveiligheid en angst. Voorts overweegt
de rechtbank dat de strafbare feiten gepleegd in de relatiesfeer een grote inbreuk maken op de
integriteit en de privacy van het slachtoffer. Het vorenoverwogene brengt de rechtbank ertoe
een gevangenisstraf [van 15 maanden] op te leggen. Teneinde verdachte te stimuleren
vrijwillig iets aan zijn alcoholverslaving te doen alsook om hem ervan te weerhouden in de
toekomst strafbare feiten te plegen, zal de rechtbank een deel van de straf voorwaardelijk
opleggen.
Accused went together with his son to the house of someone who he thought owned him
money and when he was in the house of the victim, he together with his son has intimidated
him in order to do him out of a sum of money. This failed because the victim had no money in
his house. But accused succeeded by intimidation with the pipe of a vacuum cleaner to diddle
the victim his mobile phone. [more facts]. The court reckons heavily the accused’s violent
method during the extortion and the attempt to it. With that, it is not only relevant that these
kind of facts strike great terror into the victim but also causes feelings of unsafety and fear in
the society. Further the court considers that the punishable facts, committed in the private
sphere, infringe strongly the integrity and privacy of the victim. The considerations above
bring the court to sentence to an imprisonment [of 15 months]. In order to stimulate accused
to voluntary do something about his alcoholism as also to prevent him to commit crimes in the
future, the court will impose part of the punishment suspended.

A reader will understand that the mentioned facts are claimed to be relevant for the
judgment that 15 months is an adequate punishment. However, the rather undetermined
argumentative indicators (with that …, further … and the considerations above bring …)
leave aside what precisely the relations are between the explicitly stated argumentative
utterances and the conclusion. This is a rather systematic feature of the preferred
argumentation—conclusion format. A precise reconstruction of the unexpressed premises
that are part of the argumentative responsibilities of the writer is very hard to make
because no specific and precise argumentative indicators are used. This is in fact a copy
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on ‘micro’ level of the phenomenon we observed on the level of the macro structure. The
structure suggests a (deductive) logic, but actually does not fulfill this suggestion.
The last example comes from a local appeal committee for decisions concerning
social security. The macrostructure of this decision on a petition is: the disputed decision,
matter in dispute, minutes of the hearing, case history, judgment of the dispute, decision.
Because these cases are appeal cases we see a more explicit dispute in the macrostructure.
The client got social security money, found a job, did not or too late inform the social
service, had to pay back part of his welfare money and was also fined a certain amount of
money. His protest concerns the fine. I quote and translate word by word part of a
passage that illustrates several of the micro features that we systematically observe in the
used formats.
(5) De belanghebbende heeft op grond van artikel
65 de rechtsplicht om desgevraagd of uit
eigener beweging aan burgemeester en
wethouder alle relevante informatie te
verschaffen waarvan hij weet, of redelijkerwijs
kan weten, dat deze voor het recht op bijstand
van belang is. In het algemeen mag worden
verwacht dat aangetoond wordt dat de
verstrekte informatie juist en volledig is. […]
Uit de stukken is duidelijk geworden dat u op
[datum] een loonstrook heeft ingeleverd
waaruit was op te maken dat u [datum]
inkomsten uit arbeid ontving. De uitkering
werd per [datum] beëindigd en het teveel
genoten bedrag ad [bedrag] werd als
vordering opgevoerd. In reactie verklaarde u
[verklaring]. Deze verklaring was onvoldoende
om het opleggen van de boete ad [bedrag] te
voorkomen; medegedeeld per bestreden
beschikking. Het op [datum] verlagen van de
terugvordering tot [bedrag] leidde niet tot een
verlaging van de boete. […] Het argument dat u
uw contract pas eind [datum] heeft getekend,
kan niet als reëel worden gezien […] Het
argument, dat de originele salarisberekeningen
tot en met [datum] eenmaal per kwartaal aan de
werknemers werden verstrekt, zodat u ze niet
eerder heeft kunnen afgeven, verliest zijn
kracht […].

The person concerned has on the basis of article
65 the legal duty, requested or of one’s own
accord, to supply to Mayor and Aldermen all
information of which he knows, or in fairness
can know, that it matters for the right to
welfare.
Generally speaking it may be expected that is
demonstrated that the supplied information is
correct and complete. […]
From the documents has become clear that you
have submitted on [date] a pay slip from which
could be deduced that you on [date] received
earning form labor. The allowance was ended
per [date] and the surplus of [sum] was
claimed. In response you stated that
[statement].
This statement was insufficient to prevent the
imposition of the fine of [sum]; notified
through disputed decision.
The on [date] reduction of the reclamation to
[sum] did not lead to a reduction of the fine
[…]
The argument that you did not sign your
contract until [date] can no be seen as
reasonable. […]
The argument that the original salary
calculations were given to the employees once
per quarter up and until [date], so that you
could not deliver them earlier, looses its
strength […]

Et cetera, ending in a declaration that the objection is unfounded. Besides an illustration
of the preferred order within the heart of the argumentation, the passage shows the
systematic stylistics that cover the institutional agents of judgments, evaluations and
interpretations (compare the bold expressions). The client however is explicitly staged.
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3. COMMUNICATIVE EFFICACY AND COMPREHENSIBILITY
Not only law courts, but also semi-judicial instances adopt a text format as characterized
above. Discussions with the actual writers make clear that these writers hardly reflect
upon the fact that their text format is a specific choice out of many alternatives. That is
remarkable, because alternative choices are more adequate to fulfill the stated goal of the
text: to justify (or to explain) the decision taken vis-à-vis the society.
Because the decisions are taken in a complex and formal environment and often
on the basis of a quite sophisticated exchange of positions, comprehensibility for lay
people is not obvious. If an alternative text format seems more appropriate to promote
comprehensibility than the current one, we would expect these institutions to adopt such a
format. Although this paper is not the place to argue this claim thoroughly, it may be
plausible that a format that (a) starts with the decision, that (b) coherently organizes facts
and rules in the form of complete arguments, and that (c) organizes the arguments in a
logical discussion structure, serves the goal to reach an optimal comprehensibility more
than the format actually used. Further (d) specific argumentative indicators should be
used, including (e) clear indications of the discussion roles and of the responsibilities. On
most relevant dimensions, such a format is the opposite of the format currently chosen.
The format and stylistics chosen hinder non expert readers. In the macro structure
the sections that separately present the ‘facts,’ the history and the legal framework are
pointless for the reader. The argumentative relevance is missing. This is confirmed in
fraternal discussions. Even among the specialists there is hardly ever a consensus about
the adequacy and relevance of the stated facts and rules. The presentation order misses
articulated argumentative relations. It therefore permits and even stimulates the strategy
to include everything that might be relevant.
An utterance becomes an argument in relation to a standpoint. Usually a
standpoint is easily recognizable because it directly relates to the issue at hand. The
opposite order is more difficult. It is hard to identify an utterance in it argument function
as long as one has no clear idea yet of the (sub)standpoint that it supports. This implies
that starting with the standpoint helps the reader to understand the functional
argumentative relations while reading. A comprehensible justification is not served by
presenting the reader the narrative of a (fictional) decision making process in stead of
presenting the reader the decision taken followed by a justifying argumentation.
4. THE SEMIOTICS OF THE FORMAT
We observe a strong homogeneity in the text formats used. Further we see the use of a
number of stylistic features, already noticed by Mellinkoff (1963), that are often
criticized as unwelcome but seem to be ineradicable. Many of these features—
nominalizations, exuberant use of passives, strong preference for ‘objective’
connectives—have in common that they hide the voluntary acts of the agent, often the
judge (Van den Hoven 1997).
These features are consistent. They are recognizable in the European continental
judicial tradition, but even in the judicial practices in Common Law areas, as Mellinkoff
shows. As soon as western inspired legal systems develop, these features are found. They
are deeply embedded in the legal practice. Although it proves to be possible to alter the
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macro structure in semi judicial environments, the responses to a proposed change are
revealing. Actual writers often state that a standpoint—argument order suggests partiality.
If one continues questioning why, this often results in the remark that the current practice
symbolizes impartiality. Many of the actual writers tend to say that the text format
reflects the process of decision making. Confronted with the actual dynamics of the
decision making process, this remark is often replaced by the claim that the format
reflects the process of decision making as it ‘theoretically’ or ‘ideally’ should go.
One can observe that most of the professionals do not really reflect on the basic
choices that they make in the presentation. In the institutions that we studied new
employees learn the format by copying successful examples and by a master—mate
system. A majority of the employees has a legal training and is therefore socialized in the
format during the study. A strong factor to pass on the stylistic features on the micro level
is also the form letter and form paragraph, available from databases on the intranet. So
there are certainly many social, technological and practical factors that create the
homogeneity, without a conscious, individual intention.
The strategic meaning of the format is therefore a semiotic phenomenon as it is
culturally embedded in the institutions as well as in the society. The format does carry a
strong conventional meaning. The consistency as well as persistence of the format can be
explained from the fact that it signifies the modernist ideology of legal decision making,
in its macrostructure as well as in the stylistics on a micro level. The format (especially in
the heart of the argumentation) is also very effective in covering up the moments that this
ideology is unfeasible. This symbolic meaning is consistent with education, work
procedures, expectations, tradition. Because of this institutional homogeneity the
symbolic meaning seldom ‘reaches the surface.’
The judicial and semi-judicial texts suggest that the process of decision-making is
a logical deductive process, in which essentially the will and personality of the judge are
not involved. This suggestion is signified by the narrative macro structure of the text that
suggest that the judge first objectively meets the facts, is then confronted with the force of
the appropriate rules of law and subsequently has to conclude according these facts and
rules what the decision must be. In this narrative chain of motivated acts the driving force
is not the judge (this agent is hidden by the linguistic means such as a very formal tone,
use of passives, nominalizations, avoidance of the first person), but the facts, the rules
and logic.
This suggested formal rationality and objectivity is a myth. The decision-making
process is in fact strongly determined by interpretation, sense of justice, intuitions and the
exercise of will by the judge. This is argued convincingly by many theorists, for instance
by Kelsen (Kelsen 1979, compare also Van den Hoven 1988). The Dutch legal scholar
Nieuwenhuis formulates it very outspoken. He states that of course it is a naive fiction
that it is the Law that decides, not the judge, but that this is no reason to give up this
fiction in the judicial discourse, because the acceptance of the authority of the judge is
served by this fiction (Nieuwenhuis 1995). Almost every legal theorist admits that the
extreme form of the ideology as signified by the text format is incorrect. Judges (and
semi judicial decision makers) create new meanings of the law and exercise their
subjective will in the decision-making process. So the question is why the judicial and
even the semi-judicial institutions sacrifice comprehensibility to conceal these voluntary
and law-creating acts of the decision makers.
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The explanation cannot be that of Nieuwenhuis as far as it suggests that judicial
institutions intentionally cheat the community. The lack of reflection that we observed
above already contradicts this. It must be that the semiotics of the text format reflects a
concept of justice that still has a strong ideological topicality. The rhetoric of the format
is an expression of the modernistic ideals on which a modern (Western) society is
founded. It does not simply express that the judicial decision maker pretends that he
maintains the modernistic ideology. It symbolizes that he is part of this ideology and
works and thinks according to this ideology.
Stephen Toulmin in his Cosmopolis (Toulmin 1990) situates the origins of the
ideals of modernity in the period of the thirty-year war (1618-1648 AD). Modernity is
connected with the ideals of the universal truth and values, associated with names as
Spinoza, Newton and Descartes (compare also the magnificent work of Israel 2001).
General principles do not only regulate the physical world, but also guide the normative
reality. These principles may not be easily noticeable or discoverable by the human mind,
but they are there. Therefore mankind has to be focused on these general principals and
has to discover them. An orientation on a universal discourse can lay the basis for a
general model of justice.
This is the ideal of legality, connected with the value of legal security. The ideal is
the construction of an explicit and coherent and consistent and complete system of
general rules, established by a legitimated legislator, laid down in a written codex.
According to this ideology, a legal decision is lawful if and only if it is the logical result
of the application of the rules of law as meant by the legislator. A legal decision is
righteousness and just if the decision is in harmony with that what the society experiences
as just. Lawfulness and righteousness should coincide in a codified system of law. The
modernistic view presupposes that mankind has the capacity to create, or better to
discover this perfect theory of social justice, as well as to capture this theory in a general
and internally consistent system. Or at least to work towards this ideal. This does not
mean that there can and will never be a discrepancy between lawfulness and
righteousness. But this is—still according to this modernistic ideology—a temporality.
According to the doctrine of the separation of powers it is an exclusive privilege of the
legislator to improve such an imperfection. Therefore, not the judge but the Law decides;
the judge still is assumed to be the mouth of the legislator.
This optimistic, simplified, reduced version of the modernistic ideal is symbolized
by the text format and its stylistics. The rhetorical device shows that even though it is a
theoretical consensus nowadays that the modernistic ideal is unattainable, it is still an
ideal. Symbolically modernistic ideals still guide the process of the administration of
justice in the modern society, as well as the process of legislation and the political
process behind this legislation. The fact that it is clear that these ideals are not realized
(and from a theoretical point of view cannot be realized) does not mean that society has
given up this ideology, this myth. Post-modernism is a theoretical, academic exercise that
may be convincing in many of its deconstructions. But that does not mean that its
conclusions are reflected straightforward in a discursive practice. Argumentative
discourse is an ideological sign too.
Link to commentary
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